



StaderLabs – Permissionless Stader Node Golang Security Audit

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Date of Engagement: June 1st, 2023 – June 27th, 2023

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DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

| VERSION | MODIFICATION | DATE | AUTHOR |
|---------|--------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| 0.1 | Document Creation | 06/16/2023 | Alejandro Taibo |
| 0.2 | Document Updates | 06/26/2023 | John Saigle |
| 0.3 | Draft Version | 06/27/2023 | Alejandro Taibo |
| 0.4 | Draft Review | 06/27/2023 | Gokberk Gulgun |
| 0.5 | Draft Review | 06/27/2023 | Gabi Urrutia |
| 1.0 | Remediation Plan | 06/30/2023 | Alejandro Taibo |
| 1.1 | Remediation Plan Updates | 07/04/2023 | Alejandro Taibo |
| 1.2 | Remediation Plan Review | 07/04/2023 | Gokberk Gulgun |
| 1.3 | Remediation Plan Review | 07/04/2023 | Gabi Urrutia |

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

1.1 INTRODUCTION

StaderLabs engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their node repository beginning on June 1st, 2023 and ending on June 27th, 2023. The security assessment was scoped to the repository provided to the Halborn team.

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided three weeks and three days for the engagement and assigned two full-time security engineers to audit the security of the node implementation. The security engineers are blockchain and smart-contract security experts who are skilled in advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that the node implementation functions as intended.
- Identify potential security issues with the node.

In summary, Halborn identified some minor security risks that were partially solved by the [StaderLabs team](#).

1.3 SCOPE

IN-SCOPE CODE & COMMIT:

- Repository: [stader-node-v1.1](#)
 - Commit ID: [fccb4d64335a439119a0e9a82b290d0c53c14fb6](#)

Previous repository code can also be found in the following public repository:

- Repository: [stader-node](#)
 - Commit ID: [fccb4d64335a439119a0e9a82b290d0c53c14fb6](#)
-

REMEDIATION COMMITS:

- Repository: [stader-node](#)
 - Commit IDs:
 - [631c4f2850fdf506a2d829f5d1cd1468fa3d18aa](#)
 - [805f4ece2558e3d86817f61aad3dd666854fcfcf](#)

1.4 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the custom modules. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of structures and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose.
- Static Analysis of security for scoped repository, and imported functions. (e.g., `staticcheck`, `gosec`, `unconvert`, `codeql`, `ineffassign` and `semgrep`)
- Manual Assessment for discovering security vulnerabilities on codebase.
- Ensuring correctness of the codebase.
- Dynamic Analysis on files and modules related to the project.
- Custom fuzz testing using Go's built-in fuzzing tools.

2. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on **two sets of Metrics** and a **Severity Coefficient**. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two **Metric sets** are: **Exploitability** and **Impact**. **Exploitability** captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and **Impact** describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The **Severity Coefficients** is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: **Reversibility** and **Scope**. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

2.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

| Exploitability Metric (m_E) | Metric Value | Numerical Value |
|---------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) | 1 |
| | Specific (AO:S) | 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) | 1 |
| | Medium (AC:M) | 0.67 |
| | High (AC:H) | 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) | 1 |
| | Medium (AX:M) | 0.67 |
| | High (AX:H) | 0.33 |

Exploitability E is calculated using the following formula:

$$E = \prod m_e$$

2.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

| Impact Metric (m_I) | Metric Value | Numerical Value |
|----------------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (I:N) | 0 |
| | Low (I:L) | 0.25 |
| | Medium (I:M) | 0.5 |
| | High (I:H) | 0.75 |
| | Critical (I:C) | 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) | 0 |
| | Low (I:L) | 0.25 |
| | Medium (I:M) | 0.5 |
| | High (I:H) | 0.75 |
| | Critical (I:C) | 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) | 0 |
| | Low (A:L) | 0.25 |
| | Medium (A:M) | 0.5 |
| | High (A:H) | 0.75 |
| | Critical | 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) | 0 |
| | Low (D:L) | 0.25 |
| | Medium (D:M) | 0.5 |
| | High (D:H) | 0.75 |
| | Critical (D:C) | 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) | 0 |
| | Low (Y:L) | 0.25 |
| | Medium: (Y:M) | 0.5 |
| | High: (Y:H) | 0.75 |
| | Critical (Y:H) | 1 |

Impact I is calculated using the following formula:

$$I = \max(m_I) + \frac{\sum m_I - \max(m_I)}{4}$$

2.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

| Coefficient (C) | Coefficient Value | Numerical Value |
|------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Reversibility (r) | None (R:N) | 1 |
| | Partial (R:P) | 0.5 |
| | Full (R:F) | 0.25 |
| Scope (s) | Changed (S:C) | 1.25 |
| | Unchanged (S:U) | 1 |

Severity Coefficient C is obtained by the following product:

$$C = rs$$

The Vulnerability Severity Score S is obtained by:

$$S = \min(10, EIC * 10)$$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---------------|-------------------|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |

3. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

| CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW | INFORMATIONAL |
|----------|------|--------|-----|---------------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 13 |

| SECURITY ANALYSIS | RISK LEVEL | REMEDATION DATE |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| POTENTIAL INTEGER OVERFLOW FOR CYCLES IN CLAIM REWARDS | Low (3.9) | RISK ACCEPTED |
| POTENTIAL INTEGER OVERFLOW FOR LARGE NONCES AND BLOCK NUMBERS | Low (3.9) | RISK ACCEPTED |
| USE OF ARCHITECTURE-SPECIFIC INTEGER TYPE COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS ON 32 BIT SYSTEMS | Low (3.9) | NOT APPLICABLE |
| PRECISION LOSS DUE TO DIVISION OPERATION OCCURRING BEFORE MULTIPLICATION | Low (3.1) | RISK ACCEPTED |
| FILES AND FOLDERS CREATED BY THE VALIDATOR DO NOT FOLLOW THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE | Informational (1.5) | ACKNOWLEDGED |
| USE OF UNSUPPORTED GO VERSION | Informational (0.0) | SOLVED - 07/04/2023 |
| USE OF VULNERABLE DEPENDENCIES | Informational (0.0) | ACKNOWLEDGED |
| ERROR MESSAGE REPORTS INCORRECT CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM | Informational (0.0) | SOLVED - 07/04/2023 |
| FUNCTION DECRYPTUSINGPUBLICKEY USES PRIVATEKEY INSTEAD OF PUBLICKEY AS A PARAMETER | Informational (0.0) | SOLVED - 06/30/2023 |
| FUNCTION DECRYPTUSINGPUBLICKEY IS UNUSED | Informational (0.0) | SOLVED - 06/30/2023 |
| TODOS IN CODEBASE | Informational (0.0) | SOLVED - 06/30/2023 |
| USE OF FORMATTING SYMBOL IN PRINTLN | Informational (0.0) | SOLVED - 06/30/2023 |
| VOLUNTARY EXIT MESSAGES CAN EXPIRE | Informational (0.0) | ACKNOWLEDGED |
| USE TLS IN LISTENER INSTEAD OF PLAIN HTTP | Informational (0.0) | ACKNOWLEDGED |
| ITERATION OVER A MAP MAY CAUSE ISSUES WITH VALIDATOR STORAGE | Informational (0.0) | ACKNOWLEDGED |

| | | |
|---|------------------------|--------------|
| FLOATING POINT ARITHMETIC IS NON-DETERMINISTIC | Informational (0.0) | ACKNOWLEDGED |
| UNHANDLED ERRORS | Informational (0.0) | ACKNOWLEDGED |



FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

4.1 (HAL-01) POTENTIAL INTEGER OVERFLOW FOR CYCLES IN CLAIM REWARDS - LOW (3.9)

Description:

The value for the variable `cycle` is parsed from a string into an unsigned integer and then converted to a signed integer without any validation. For very large values, this can cause logical issues, as the conversion will result in a negative `int64` value.

Code Location:

`stader-cli/node/claim-sp-rewards.go`

Listing 1: An unchecked type conversion occurs in the else block following the CLI prompt

```
99     cycleSelection := cliutils.Prompt("Select the cycles for
↳ which you wish to claim the rewards. Enter the cycles numbers in a
↳ comma separate format without any space (e.g. 1,2,3,4) or leave
↳ it blank to claim all cycles at once.", "^$|^\\d+(,\\d+)*$", "
↳ Unexpected input. Please enter a comma separated list of cycle
↳ numbers or leave it blank to claim all cycles at once.")
100     if cycleSelection == "" {
101         for _, cycle := range cycleIndexes {
102             cyclesToClaim[cycle.Int64()] = true
103         }
104         break
105     } else {
106         elements := strings.Split(cycleSelection, ",")
107         allValid := true
108         for _, element := range elements {
109             cycle, err := strconv.ParseUint(element, 0, 64)
110             if err != nil {
111                 fmt.Printf("Unable to parse element: %s",
↳ element)
112                 allValid = false
113             }

```



```
114
115         // check if unclaimedCycles contains the cycle
116         found := false
117         for _, unclaimedCycle := range cycleIndexes {
118             if unclaimedCycle.Int64() == int64(cycle) {
119                 found = true
120                 break
121             }
122         }
123         if !found {
124             fmt.Printf("Cycle %d is not in the list of
↳ unclaimed cycles. Please enter a valid cycle number\n", cycle)
125             allValid = false
126         } else {
127             cyclesToClaim[int64(cycle)] = true
128         }
129     }
130
131     if allValid {
132         break
133     }
134 }
135
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:L/A:L/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (3.9)

Recommendation:

Consider using a single integer type to represent values in order to avoid issues that can occur when converting between types. Alternatively, add validation checks to ensure that the values do not lie outside the range of the `int64` data type. Consider rejecting negative integer values if they do not have a specific use case.

Remediation Plan:

RISK ACCEPTED: The `StaderLabs team` accepted the risk of this issue and states the following:

Converting cycle to a signed integer is not a concern, as we have confirmed that the value will never exceed the maximum uint64 range. There's no risk of overflow or logical issues in this specific context.

4.2 (HAL-02) POTENTIAL INTEGER OVERFLOW FOR LARGE NONCES AND BLOCK NUMBERS - LOW (3.9)

Description:

Several functions exposed by Ethereum client libraries return uint64 values that are converted to int64 without checking that they will fit into the range of values represented by int64. For very large values, this can cause logical issues, as the conversion will result in a negative int64 value.

Code Location:

`stader/api/wallet/status.go`

Listing 2: `NonceAt()` and `PendingNonceAt()` return uint64 values that are converted to int64

```
31 func getStatus(c *cli.Context) (*api.WalletStatusResponse, error)
32 ↪ {
33     // Get services
34     pm, err := services.GetPasswordManager(c)
35     if err != nil {
36         return nil, err
37     }
38     w, err := services.GetWallet(c)
39     if err != nil {
40         return nil, err
41     }
42     ec, err := services.GetEthClient(c)
43     if err != nil {
44         return nil, err
45     }
46
47     // Response
48     response := api.WalletStatusResponse{}
49
```

```
50 // Get wallet status
51 response.PasswordSet = pm.IsPasswordSet()
52 response.WalletInitialized = w.IsInitialized()
53
54 // Get accounts if initialized
55 if response.WalletInitialized {
56
57     // Get node account
58     nodeAccount, err := w.GetNodeAccount()
59     if err != nil {
60         return nil, err
61     }
62     response.AccountAddress = nodeAccount.Address
63
64     currentBlockNumber, err := ec.BlockNumber(context.
65     ↳ Background())
66     if err != nil {
67         return nil, err
68     }
69     currentNonce, err := ec.NonceAt(context.Background(),
70     ↳ nodeAccount.Address, big.NewInt(int64(currentBlockNumber)))
71     if err != nil {
72         return nil, err
73     }
74     pendingNonce, err := ec.PendingNonceAt(context.Background
75     ↳ (), nodeAccount.Address)
76     if err != nil {
77         return nil, err
78     }
79     response.PendingNonce = big.NewInt(int64(pendingNonce))
80     response.CurrentNonce = big.NewInt(int64(currentNonce))
81 }
82 // Return response
83 return &response, nil
84
85 }
```

[stader/api/node/claim-sp-rewards.go](https://github.com/stader/api/node/claim-sp-rewards.go)

Listing 3: GetCurrentBlockNumber() returns a uint64 value that is converted to int64

```

13 func GetCyclesDetailedInfo(c *cli.Context, stringifiedCycles
↳ string) (*api.CyclesDetailedInfo, error) {
14     cfg, err := services.GetConfig(c)
15     if err != nil {
16         return nil, err
17     }
18     sp, err := services.GetSocializingPoolContract(c)
19     if err != nil {
20         return nil, err
21     }
22
23     cycles, err := string_utils.DestringifyArray(stringifiedCycles
↳ )
24     if err != nil {
25         return nil, err
26     }
27
28     response := api.CyclesDetailedInfo{}
29     merkleProofs := []api.DetailedMerkleProofInfo{}
30     for _, cycle := range cycles {
31         merkleCycleProof, exists, err := cfg.StaderNode.
↳ ReadCycleCache(cycle.Int64())
32         if err != nil {
33             return nil, err
34         }
35         if !exists {
36             continue
37         }
38
39         currentBlock, err := eth1.GetCurrentBlockNumber(c)
40         if err != nil {
41             return nil, err
42         }
43         cycleDetails, err := socializing_pool.
↳ GetRewardCycleDetails(sp, cycle, nil)
44         if err != nil {
45             return nil, err
46         }
47
48         cycleStartBlock := currentBlock
49         if cycleDetails.StartBlock.Cmp(big.NewInt(int64(
↳ currentBlock))) < 0 {

```

```

50         cycleStartBlock = cycleDetails.StartBlock.Uint64()
51     }
52     cycleStartTime, err := eth1.ConvertBlockToTimestamp(c,
↳ int64(cycleStartBlock))
53     if err != nil {
54         return nil, err
55     }
56
57     merkleProofs = append(merkleProofs, api.
↳ DetailedMerkleProofInfo{
58         MerkleProofInfo: merkleCycleProof,
59         CycleTime:      cycleStartTime,
60     })
61 }
62
63 response.DetailedCyclesInfo = merkleProofs
64
65 return &response, nil
66 }

```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:L/A:L/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (3.9)

Recommendation:

Consider using a single integer type to represent values in order to avoid issues that can occur when converting between types. Alternatively, add validation checks to ensure that the values do not lie outside the range of the `int64` data type. Consider rejecting negative integer values if they do not have a specific use case.

Remediation Plan:

RISK ACCEPTED: The `StaderLabs` team accepted the risk of this issue and states the following:

We do not expect nonce or block number to overflow the max of `uint64`.

4.3 (HAL-03) USE OF ARCHITECTURE-SPECIFIC INTEGER TYPE COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS ON 32 BIT SYSTEMS – LOW (3.9)

Description:

The `int` type defaults to the system's architecture. On 32-bit systems this may cause unexpected issues as the type conversion to `int` is equivalent to using `int32`.

If the program is expecting to always work with 64 bit values, this could lead to integer truncation or overflows on 32-bit systems, which may in turn lead to logic issues.

Code Location:

In this example, the user is prompted for a `gwei` value. If the number they specify is larger than `MAX_INT32`, the value will be truncated. This may cause unexpected issues in operation when the value is converted into a `float64`.

`shared/services/gas/gas.go`, multiple locations

Listing 4

```

197     fmt.Printf("%s+===== Suggested Gas Prices
↳ =====+\n", log.ColorBlue)
198     fmt.Println("| Avg Wait Time | Max Fee | Total Gas Cost
↳ |")
199     fmt.Printf("| %-13s | %-9s | %.4f to %.4f ETH |\n",
200         gasSuggestion.RapidTime, fmt.Sprintf("%d gwei", int(
↳ rapidGwei)), rapidLowLimit, rapidHighLimit)
201     fmt.Printf("| %-13s | %-9s | %.4f to %.4f ETH |\n",
202         gasSuggestion.FastTime, fmt.Sprintf("%d gwei", int(
↳ fastGwei)), fastLowLimit, fastHighLimit)
203     fmt.Printf("| %-13s | %-9s | %.4f to %.4f ETH |\n",

```

```

204     gasSuggestion.StandardTime, fmt.Sprintf("%d gwei", int(
    ↳ standardGwei)), standardLowLimit, standardHighLimit)
205     fmt.Printf("| %-13s | %-9s | %.4f to %.4f ETH |\n",
206     gasSuggestion.SlowTime, fmt.Sprintf("%d gwei", int(
    ↳ slowGwei)), slowLowLimit, slowHighLimit)
207     fmt.Printf("
    ↳ +=====+\n\n%s", log.
    ↳ ColorReset)
208
209     fmt.Printf("These prices include a maximum priority fee of %.2
    ↳ f gwei.\n", priorityFee)
210
211     for {
212         desiredPrice := cliutils.Prompt(
213             fmt.Sprintf("Please enter your max fee (including the
    ↳ priority fee) or leave blank for the default of %d gwei:", int(
    ↳ fastGwei)),
214             "^(?:[1-9]\\d*|0)?(?:\\.\\d+)?$",
215             "Not a valid gas price, try again:")
216
217         if desiredPrice == "" {
218             return fastGwei
219         }
220
221         desiredPriceFloat, err := strconv.ParseFloat(desiredPrice,
    ↳ 64)

```

BVSS:

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:L/A:L/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (3.9)

Recommendation:

Consider using `int64` explicitly to ensure that no issues occur when the code runs on 32-bit systems.

Remediation Plan:

NOT APPLICABLE: The [StaderLabs team](#) states that they do not support 32-bit build. Therefore, this issue is not applicable.

4.4 (HAL-04) PRECISION LOSS DUE TO DIVISION OPERATION OCCURRING BEFORE MULTIPLICATION - LOW (3.1)

Description:

Unless done carefully, division and multiplication operations are typically not commutative when working with floating-point values. Dividing before multiplying can yield a smaller result than multiplying before dividing.

Code Location:

`shared/services/gas/gas.go`, multiple locations

Listing 5

```
71     if maxFeeGwei != 0 {
72         fmt.Printf("%sUsing the requested max fee of %.2f gwei (
↳ including a max priority fee of %.2f gwei).\n", log.ColorYellow,
↳ maxFeeGwei, maxPriorityFeeGwei)
73
74         var lowLimit float64
75         var highLimit float64
76         if gasLimit == 0 {
77             lowLimit = maxFeeGwei / eth.WeiPerGwei * float64(
↳ gasInfo.EstGasLimit)
78             highLimit = maxFeeGwei / eth.WeiPerGwei * float64(
↳ gasInfo.SafeGasLimit)
79         } else {
80             lowLimit = maxFeeGwei / eth.WeiPerGwei * float64(
↳ gasLimit)
81             highLimit = lowLimit
82         }
83         fmt.Printf("Total cost: %.4f to %.4f ETH%s\n", lowLimit,
↳ highLimit, log.ColorReset)
84
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:L/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (3.1)

Recommendation:

Perform multiplication before dividing in order to prefer larger values that will not cause calculated amounts to be underestimated.

Remediation Plan:

RISK ACCEPTED: The [StaderLabs team](#) accepted the risk of this issue and states the following:

We are not using floating-point vars in any critical steps, for example in `gas.go` is used for only estimating the gas, to give directional sense for the operators, so it does not need precision.

4.5 (HAL-05) FILES AND FOLDERS CREATED BY THE VALIDATOR DO NOT FOLLOW THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE – INFORMATIONAL (1.5)

Description:

In addition, to the specific vulnerability described above, several folders are configured in the code with lax permissions, such as `775` or `664`. In both cases, any user on the operating system can read the contents of folders.

Code Location:

Listing 6

```
1 stader-cli/service/service.go
2 543:     err = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(volumePath, "validators"),
↳ 0775)
3
4 shared/services/stader/client.go
5 1355:    err = os.Mkdir(runtimeFolder, 0775)
6 1521:    err = os.MkdirAll(customKeyDir, 0775)
7
8 stader/node/node.go
9 400:        err = os.MkdirAll(validatorsFolder, 0755)
10 shared/services/stader/client.go
11 294:     err = os.Chmod(prometheusConfigPath, 0664)
```

BVSS:

A0:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:H/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (1.5)

Recommendation:

All folders used by the validator should follow the principle of least privilege. System users should not be able to read the validator's files. Group permissions should be restricted unless there is a key business case for allowing more than one system user to access files used by the node.

Files that do not contain code should not be executable.

Safer file permission strings would be `750` to allow for group access, or `640` for files without code. To restrict files to only the owner, the strings `700` or `600` should be used.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The [StaderLabs team](#) acknowledged this issue and states the following:

All the critical files (like validator keys, wallet, etc.) created for stader node do not have read or write access to non-root users.

4.6 (HAL-06) USE OF UNSUPPORTED GO VERSION - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

The project uses Go version [1.13](#). This version has been deprecated. See the [Go release notes](#) for their policy on supporting major versions of Go.

Code Location:

go.mod

Listing 7

```
1 module github.com/stader-labs/stader-node
2
3 go 1.13
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

Update to a supported version of Go in order to receive ongoing security updates.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The [StaderLabs team](#) solved the issue by updating the Go version to [1.16](#) in the following commit ID:

- [631c4f2850fdf506a2d829f5d1cd1468fa3d18aa](#).

4.7 (HAL-07) USE OF VULNERABLE DEPENDENCIES - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

Several external packages are outdated and/or contain known vulnerabilities.

Code Location:

Excerpts of the output from both tools can be found in the [Automated Testing](#) section at the end of the report.

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

Where possible, keep dependencies patched in order to reduce the risk of the system being attacked using known vulnerabilities. A tool like [govulncheck](#) can be added to the project's CI pipeline. This can then be configured to show serious issues that could affect the project.

It is important to note that many of these vulnerabilities flagged by [govulncheck](#) are unlikely to be exploitable in practice, as they larger refer to a Web2 context. In addition, the [nancy](#) tool reported issues that Halborn determined to be false positives.

Halborn recommends running the [nancy](#) and [govulncheck](#) tools regularly and to fix as many warnings as possible.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The [StaderLabs team](#) acknowledged this issue and states the following:

The code is tested end to end, and the old versions do work as expected , we do not see any risk to the user funds with this.

4.8 (HAL-08) ERROR MESSAGE REPORTS INCORRECT CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM – INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

Error messages relating to cryptographic operations incorrectly state that PKIX public keys are being used.

Code Location:

[shared/utils/crypto/rsa.go](#)

Listing 8

```
19 func BytesToPublicKey(pub []byte) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
20     block, _ := pem.Decode(pub)
21     b := block.Bytes
22     var err error
23
24     key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PublicKey(b)
25     if err != nil {
26         fmt.Printf("Error using x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey %v\n", err
↳ )
27         return nil, err
28     }
29
30     return key, nil
31 }
32
33 func BytesToPrivateKey(pub []byte) (*rsa.PrivateKey, error) {
34     block, _ := pem.Decode(pub)
35     b := block.Bytes
36     var err error
37
38     key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(b)
39     if err != nil {
40         fmt.Printf("Error using x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey %v\n", err
↳ )
41         return nil, err
```



```
42     }  
43  
44     return key, nil  
45 }
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

Correct the debug message so that it matches the code.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The [StaderLabs team](#) solved the issue by using [PKIX](#) instead in the following commit ID:

- [631c4f2850fdf506a2d829f5d1cd1468fa3d18aa](#).

4.9 (HAL-09) FUNCTION DECRYPTUSINGPUBLICKEY USES PRIVATEKEY INSTEAD OF PUBLICKEY AS A PARAMETER – INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

The function parameter used for `DecryptUsingPublicKey` is, in fact, a private key. This could result in cryptographic errors.

Note that this function is not used in the codebase, and so this finding is considered only an informational issue. However, if this function is used in the codebase in a future release, then this confusion between public and private keys could result in cryptographic issues with serious consequences for the protocol.

Code Location:

`shared/utils/crypto/rsa.go`, L49

Listing 9

```
49 func DecryptUsingPublicKey(data []byte, privateKey *rsa.PrivateKey
↳ ) ([]byte, error) {
50     exitMsgEncrypted, err := rsa.DecryptOAEP(sha256.New(), rand.
↳ Reader, privateKey, data, nil)
51     if err != nil {
52         return nil, err
53     }
54
55     return exitMsgEncrypted, nil
56 }
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

Delete the function if it is not needed. Otherwise, ensure that the function name, parameters, and are internally consistent. Always carefully verify that cryptographic protocols conform with known best practices.

To improve code readability, it is also recommended to change the variable name from `exitMsgEncrypted` to `exitMsgDecrypted` as this function performs decryption.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `StaderLabs` team solved the issue by removing the aforementioned function in the following commit ID:

- `805f4ece2558e3d86817f61aad3dd666854fcfcf`.

4.10 (HAL-10) FUNCTION DECRYPTUSINGPUBLICKEY IS UNUSED - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

The function `DecryptUsingPublicKey` in the file `shared/utils/crypto/rsa.go` is unused.

Code Location:

`shared/utils/crypto/rsa.go, L49`

Listing 10

```
49 func DecryptUsingPublicKey(data []byte, privateKey *rsa.PrivateKey
↳ ) ([]byte, error) {
50     exitMsgEncrypted, err := rsa.DecryptOAEP(sha256.New(), rand.
↳ Reader, privateKey, data, nil)
51     if err != nil {
52         return nil, err
53     }
54
55     return exitMsgEncrypted, nil
56 }
```

BVSS:

`A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)`

Recommendation:

Remove unused code from the codebase. This can help improve maintainability.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The [StaderLabs team](#) solved the issue by removing the aforementioned function in the following commit ID:

- [805f4ece2558e3d86817f61aad3dd666854fcfcf](#).

4.11 (HAL-11) TODOS IN CODEBASE - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

Numerous code comments in the codebase contain **TODO** messages.

Code Location:

Listing 11

```
1 shared/services/wallet/node.go:173: // TODO: remove this if
↳ Prater ever goes away!
2 stader-cli/node/withdraw-sd.go:39: // TODO - bchain - rework
↳ error messages
3 stader-cli/service/configMonitoring.go:36: // TODO:
4 stader-cli/service/configMonitoring.go:77: // TODO:
5 stader-cli/service/configConsensus.go:179: // Nimbus TODO? check
6 stader-cli/service/service.go:781:// TODO: this is temporary and
↳ can change, clean it up when Nimbus supports split mode
7 shared/services/config/stader-config.go:800: // TODO - we have
↳ to pick this from stader config but ethx address shouldnt change
8 shared/utils/validator/fee-recipient.go:169: // TODO:
↳ return here if the container doesn't exist? Is erroring out
↳ necessary?
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use a separate issue tracker or other task management software to track bugs and features rather than using code comments. Developer notes in comments are very likely to be overlooked and to become out of date relative to the code.

If the source code is shared publicly, such developer notes indicate areas of confusion or complexity which may be leveraged by an attacker reading the code.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The [StaderLabs team](#) solved the issue by removing the aforementioned `TODOs` comments in the following commit ID:

- [805f4ece2558e3d86817f61aad3dd666854fcfcf](#).

4.12 (HAL-12) USE OF FORMATTING SYMBOL IN PRINTLN - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

A formatting symbol is used in `fmt.Println`. `fmt.Printf` or similar should be used to properly display data.

Code Location:

`shared/services/gas/gas.go`, L223

Listing 12

```
223         fmt.Println("Not a valid gas price (%s), try again.",  
    ↪ err.Error())
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

Use `fmt.Printf` instead of `fmt.Println`.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `StaderLabs` team solved the issue by using `fmt.Printf` instead of `fmt.Println` in the following commit ID:

- [805f4ece2558e3d86817f61aad3dd666854fcfcf](#).

4.13 (HAL-13) VOLUNTARY EXIT MESSAGES CAN EXPIRE - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

Periodically, the node executes a routine to verify whether all validators associated to it have their voluntary exit messages registered in the protocol back-end. These voluntary exit messages, which are signed for each validator, could be used later in order to control when a node should be working or not, and in case a node is misbehaving, remove it from the process of validating block.

However, since these signed messages include the fork version, they expire after **two** network upgrades. Therefore, these registered messages should be updated in the back-end under the aforementioned circumstances.

Code Location:

[stader/node/node.go](#), L230

Listing 13: [stader/node/node.go](#) (Line 230)

```
225     registeredPresign, ok := preSignRegisteredMap[validatorPubKey.  
    ↳ String()]  
226     if !ok {  
227         errorLog.Printf("Could not query presign api to check if  
    ↳ validator: %s is registered\n", validatorPubKey)  
228         continue  
229     }  
230     if registeredPresign {  
231         infoLog.Printf("Validator pub key: %s pre signed key  
    ↳ already registered\n", validatorPubKey)  
232         continue  
233     } else {  
234         infoLog.Printf("Validator pub key: %s pre signed key not  
    ↳ registered. Creating presigned message\n", validatorPubKey)  
235     }
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

It is convenient to handle this situation by implementing a way to renew these signed messages and store them in the back-end.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The [StaderLabs team](#) acknowledged this issue and states the following:

We are planning to resend pre-sign messages after a hard fork.

4.14 (HAL-14) USE TLS IN LISTENER INSTEAD OF PLAIN HTTP - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

It has been identified that the node exports some data containing metrics via HTTP. It is recommended to use TLS for this purpose.

Code Location:

stader/guardian/metrics-exporter.go, L100

Listing 14: (Line 100)

```
90 http.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
↳ {
91     w.Write([]byte(`
```

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use `TLS` by modifying the highlighted line to `http.ListenAndServeTLS` which allows `TLS` usage.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The `StaderLabs` team acknowledged this issue and states the following:

The metrics server is only used by the local prometheus server as of now. Also, the metrics server runs as a docker container, to serve it externally with SSL the operator can set up SSL certificates with the instance host name

4.15 (HAL-15) ITERATION OVER A MAP MAY CAUSE ISSUES WITH VALIDATOR STORAGE - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

Iterating over maps is non-deterministic in Go. As a result, errors can occur when the iteration executes for only some elements of the map. This can happen when the iteration terminates early, e.g., when an error occurs and the code returns before iterating over the remaining elements. This can be especially problematic in a blockchain context when consensus depends on a non-deterministic operation. If the nodes fail to reach the same state due to non-determinism, the chain can halt.

During the engagement, Halborn identified numerous locations where this pattern occurs and may have undesirable side effects. Each of these patterns has been individually checked, and they do not pose a risk in this context.

Code Location:

Due to non-deterministic iteration, the following sections of code could result in undesired system states.

In the first example, the iteration may delete some key stores but not others. For example, if there are 3 key stores, `{A, B, C}`, and only key store `C` triggers an error when `os.RemoveAll` is called, this could result in the following scenarios, depending on the iteration order:

- `C` is evaluated first: No key stores are deleted.
- `C` is evaluated second: Either `A` or `B` is deleted, but not both; `C` is not deleted.
- `C` is evaluated last: `A` and `B` are deleted.

Similar scenarios can occur for all excerpts below.

shared/services/wallet/validator.go

Listing 15

```

181 // Deletes all of the keystore directories and persistent VC
    ↳ storage
182 func (w *Wallet) DeleteValidatorStores() error {
183
184     for name := range w.keystores {
185         keystorePath := w.keystores[name].GetKeystoreDir()
186         err := os.RemoveAll(keystorePath)
187         if err != nil {
188             return fmt.Errorf("error deleting validator directory
    ↳ for %s: %w", name, err)
189         }
190     }
191
192     return nil
193 }

```

Listing 16

```

245 // Save a validator key
246 func (w *Wallet) SaveValidatorKey(key ValidatorKey) error {
247
248     // Update account index
249     if key.WalletIndex > w.ws.NextAccount {
250         w.ws.NextAccount = key.WalletIndex
251     }
252
253     // Update keystores
254     for name := range w.keystores {
255         // Update the keystore in the wallet - using an iterator
    ↳ variable only runs it on the local copy
256         if err := w.keystores[name].StoreValidatorKey(key.
    ↳ PrivateKey, key.DerivationPath); err != nil {
257             return fmt.Errorf("could not store validator key %s in
    ↳ %s keystore: %w", key.PublicKey.Hex(), name, err)
258         }
259     }
260
261     // Return
262     return nil
263 }

```

```
264 }
```

Listing 17

```
266 // Recover a validator key by public key
267 func (w *Wallet) RecoverValidatorKey(pubkey stadertypes.
↳ ValidatorPubkey, startIndex uint) (uint, error) {
268
269     // Check wallet is initialized
270     if !w.IsInitialized() {
271         return 0, errors.New("Wallet is not initialized")
272     }
273
274     // Find matching validator key
275     var index uint
276     var validatorKey *eth2types.BLSPrivateKey
277     var derivationPath string
278     for index = 0; index < MaxValidatorKeyRecoverAttempts; index++
↳ {
279         if key, path, err := w.getValidatorPrivateKey(index +
↳ startIndex); err != nil {
280             return 0, err
281         } else if bytes.Equal(pubkey.Bytes(), key.PublicKey().
↳ Marshal()) {
282             validatorKey = key
283             derivationPath = path
284             break
285         }
286     }
287
288     // Check validator key
289     if validatorKey == nil {
290         return 0, fmt.Errorf("Validator %s key not found", pubkey.
↳ Hex())
291     }
292
293     // Update account index
294     nextIndex := index + startIndex + 1
295     if nextIndex > w.ws.NextAccount {
296         w.ws.NextAccount = nextIndex
297     }
298
299     // Update keystores
300     for name := range w.keystores {
```

```

301         // Update the keystore in the wallet - using an iterator
    ↳ variable only runs it on the local copy
302         if err := w.keystores[name].StoreValidatorKey(validatorKey
    ↳ , derivationPath); err != nil {
303             return 0, fmt.Errorf("Could not store %s validator key
    ↳ : %w", name, err)
304         }
305     }
306
307     // Return
308     return index + startIndex, nil
309
310 }

```

stader-cli/service/service.go

Listing 18

```

422 // Updates a configuration from the provided CLI arguments
    ↳ headlessly
423 func configureHeadless(c *cli.Context, cfg *config.StaderConfig)
    ↳ error {
424
425     // Root params
426     for _, param := range cfg.GetParameters() {
427         err := updateConfigParamFromCliArg(c, "", param, cfg)
428         if err != nil {
429             return err
430         }
431     }
432
433     // Subconfigs
434     for sectionName, subconfig := range cfg.GetSubconfigs() {
435         for _, param := range subconfig.GetParameters() {
436             err := updateConfigParamFromCliArg(c, sectionName,
    ↳ param, cfg)
437             if err != nil {
438                 return err
439             }
440         }
441     }
442
443     return nil

```



```
444  
445 }
```

BVSS:**A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)****Recommendation:**

When iterating over a map, explicitly sort the results in order to ensure a deterministic operation. Avoid returning early from a loop or aborting on errors in any other way. This can help to prevent cases where execution occurs for only some map elements rather than all of them.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The [StaderLabs team](#) acknowledged this issue and states the following:

Stader node doesn't run in a blockchain context so having non deterministic code is not an issue.

4.16 (HAL-16) FLOATING POINT ARITHMETIC IS NON-DETERMINISTIC – INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

Floating-point arithmetic is often non-deterministic on different machines. Using non-deterministic operations in a blockchain context may result in a chain halt if different validators cannot reach a shared state.

However, this issue does not pose a risk in this component since it doesn't run in a blockchain context.

Code Location:

`shared/services/gas/gas.go`, multiple locations

Listing 19

```
71     if maxFeeGwei != 0 {
72         fmt.Printf("%sUsing the requested max fee of %.2f gwei (
↳ including a max priority fee of %.2f gwei).\n", log.ColorYellow,
↳ maxFeeGwei, maxPriorityFeeGwei)
73
74         var lowLimit float64
75         var highLimit float64
76         if gasLimit == 0 {
77             lowLimit = maxFeeGwei / eth.WeiPerGwei * float64(
↳ gasInfo.EstGasLimit)
78             highLimit = maxFeeGwei / eth.WeiPerGwei * float64(
↳ gasInfo.SafeGasLimit)
79         } else {
80             lowLimit = maxFeeGwei / eth.WeiPerGwei * float64(
↳ gasLimit)
81             highLimit = lowLimit
82         }
83         fmt.Printf("Total cost: %.4f to %.4f ETH%s\n", lowLimit,
↳ highLimit, log.ColorReset)
```

BVSS:**A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)****Recommendation:**

Consider refactoring the code to perform operations using integer types rather than floating-point types. For assets such as Ether, arithmetic operations should be calculated using integers that represent **wei**, the smallest denomination of Ether.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The **StaderLabs team** acknowledged this issue and states the following:

Stader node doesn't run in the context of a blockchain so having non deterministic code is not an issue.

4.17 (HAL-17) UNHANDLED ERRORS – INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

Functions called in the code base may return errors that are unchecked. This could lead to undesirable system states where execution occurs on invalid data.

However, each case has been independently checked and none of them poses a risk.

Code Location:

Listing 20: Output from errcheck scan

```

1 shared/services/beacon/client/std-http-client.go:836:3: _ =
↳ response.Body.Close()
2 shared/services/beacon/client/std-http-client.go:866:3: _ =
↳ response.Body.Close()
3 shared/services/config/stader-config.go:459:22: cfg.
↳ applyAllDefaults()
4 shared/services/gas/etherchain/etherchain.go:68:3: _ = response.
↳ Body.Close()
5 shared/services/gas/etherscan/etherscan.go:58:3: _ = response.
↳ Body.Close()
6 shared/services/stader/client.go:88:28: ip4Consensus.UseIPProtocol
↳ (4)
7 shared/services/stader/client.go:95:28: ip6Consensus.UseIPProtocol
↳ (6)
8 shared/services/stader/client.go:165:3: _ = c.client.Close()
9 shared/services/stader/client.go:275:12: os.Setenv(varName,
↳ varValue)
10 shared/services/stader/client.go:286:12: os.Setenv(name, value)
11 shared/services/stader/client.go:392:21: convertUintParam(param
↳ , &cfg.Lighthouse.MaxPeers, network, 16)
12 shared/services/stader/client.go:394:21: convertUintParam(param
↳ , &cfg.Nimbus.MaxPeers, network, 16)
13 shared/services/stader/client.go:396:21: convertUintParam(param
↳ , &cfg.Prysm.MaxPeers, network, 16)

```

```

14 shared/services/stader/client.go:398:21:   convertUintParam(param
↳ , &cfg.Teku.MaxPeers, network, 16)
15 shared/services/stader/client.go:401:20:   convertUintParam(param
↳ , &cfg.ConsensusCommon.P2pPort, network, 16)
16 shared/services/stader/client.go:415:20:   convertUintParam(param
↳ , &cfg.Prysm.RpcPort, network, 16)
17 shared/services/stader/client.go:428:20:   convertUintParam(param
↳ , &cfg.BnMetricsPort, network, 16)
18 shared/services/stader/client.go:430:20:   convertUintParam(param
↳ , &cfg.VcMetricsPort, network, 16)
19 shared/services/stader/client.go:432:20:   convertUintParam(param
↳ , &cfg.NodeMetricsPort, network, 16)
20 shared/services/stader/client.go:434:20:   convertUintParam(param
↳ , &cfg.ExporterMetricsPort, network, 16)
21 shared/services/stader/client.go:436:20:   convertUintParam(param
↳ , &cfg.Prometheus.Port, network, 16)
22 shared/services/stader/client.go:438:20:   convertUintParam(param
↳ , &cfg.Grafana.Port, network, 16)
23 shared/services/stader/client.go:479:22:   c.migrateCcSelection(
↳ legacyCfg.Chains.Eth2.Client.Selected, &cfg.Native.ConsensusClient
↳ )
24 shared/services/stader/client.go:517:3:   _ = cmd.Close()
25 shared/services/stader/client.go:548:8:   _, _ = c.Println(scanner.
↳ Text())
26 shared/services/stader/client.go:1197:21:  convertUintParam(param
↳ , &geth.CacheSize, network, 0)
27 shared/services/stader/client.go:1201:21:  convertUintParam(param
↳ , &geth.MaxPeers, network, 16)
28 shared/services/stader/client.go:1205:21:  convertUintParam(param
↳ , &ecCommon.P2pPort, network, 16)
29 shared/services/stader/client.go:1364:12:  os.Setenv(varName,
↳ varValue)
30 shared/services/stader/client.go:1369:13:  os.Setenv(name, value)
31 shared/services/stader/client.go:1575:13:  os.Setenv(key,
↳ shellescape.Quote(value))
32 shared/services/stader/client.go:1737:17:  defer cmd.Close()
33 shared/services/stader/client.go:1766:3:   _ = cmd.Close()
34 shared/utils/cli/prompt.go:76:9:   index, _ := strconv.Atoi(
↳ response)
35 shared/utils/stader/merkle-proof-download.go:24:22: defer res.Body
↳ .Close()
36 shared/utils/stader/pre-signed-flows.go:24:22: defer res.Body.
↳ Close()
37 shared/utils/stader/pre-signed-flows.go:45:22: defer res.Body.

```

```

↳ Close()
38 shared/utils/stader/pre-signed-flows.go:69:22: defer res.Body.
↳ Close()
39 shared/utils/stader/pre-signed-flows.go:86:22: defer res.Body.
↳ Close()
40 shared/utils/stader/pre-signed-flows.go:107:22: defer res.Body.
↳ Close()
41 shared/utils/validator/fee-recipient.go:56:15: clientType, _ :=
↳ bc.GetClientType()
42 shared/utils/validator/fee-recipient.go:137:15: clientType, _ :=
↳ bc.GetClientType()
43 stader-cli/service/service.go:620:27: staderClient.SaveConfig(
↳ cfg)
44 stader-cli/validator/export.go:58:18: defer file.Close()
45 stader-cli/wallet/init.go:108:2: _ = term.Clear()
46 stader-lib/stader/abi.go:47:3: _ = zlibReader.Close()
47 stader/guardian/metrics-exporter.go:91:10: w.Write([]byte(`

```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

Always handle errors safely to avoid unexpected negative outcomes.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The [StaderLabs team](#) acknowledged this issue and states the following:

There is no risk posed (such as a node crash or loss of funds) by not handling the errors at the specified places.



AUTOMATED TESTING

Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance coverage of certain areas of the scoped component. Among the tools used were staticcheck, gosec, semgrep, unconvert, CodeQL and Nancy. After Halborn verified all the contracts and scoped structures in the repository and was able to compile them correctly, these tools were leveraged on scoped structures. With these tools, Halborn can statically verify security related issues across the entire codebase.

Semgrep:

Security Analysis Output Sample

Listing 21: Rule Set

```

1 semgrep --config "p/dgryski.semgrep-go" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
↳ max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o dgryski.semgrep
2 semgrep --config "p/owasp-top-ten" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
↳ max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o owasp-top-ten.
↳ semgrep
3 semgrep --config "p/r2c-security-audit" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
↳ max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o r2c-security-audit.
↳ semgrep
4 semgrep --config "p/r2c-ci" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
↳ max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o r2c-ci.semgrep
5 semgrep --config "p/ci" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
↳ max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o ci.semgrep
6 semgrep --config "p/golang" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
↳ max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o golang.semgrep
7 semgrep --config "p/trailofbits" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
↳ max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o trailofbits.semgrep

```


AUTOMATED TESTING



Scan Status

Scanning 319 files with 1077 Code rules:

| Language | Rules | Files | Origin | Rules |
|-------------|-------|-------|-----------|-------|
| <multilang> | 60 | 879 | Community | 1077 |
| go | 86 | 218 | | |
| bash | 4 | 19 | | |
| json | 4 | 14 | | |
| yaml | 27 | 13 | | |
| dockerfile | 4 | 1 | | |

100% 0:00:02

28 Code Findings

```

shared/services/beacon/client/std-http-client.go
  trailofbits.go.questionable-assignment.questionable-assignment
  Should `attestationInfo[i]` be modified when an error could be returned?
  Details: https://sg.run/qq6y

502: attestationInfo[i].AggregationBits, err = hex.DecodeString(bitString)
-----
  trailofbits.go.questionable-assignment.questionable-assignment
  Should `info` be modified when an error could be returned?
  Details: https://sg.run/qq6y

541: info.AggregationBits, err = hex.DecodeString(bitString)

shared/services/config/stader-config.go
  javascript.lang.security.detect-insecure-websocket.detect-insecure-websocket
  Insecure WebSocket Detected. WebSocket Secure (wss) should be used for all WebSocket
  connections.
  Details: https://sg.run/GWyz

817: envVars["EC_WS_ENDPOINT"] = fmt.Sprintf("ws://%s:%d", Eth1ContainerName,
  cfg.ExecutionCommon.WsPort.Value)
-----
819: envVars["EC_ENGINE_WS_ENDPOINT"] = fmt.Sprintf("ws://%s:%d", Eth1ContainerName,
  cfg.ExecutionCommon.EnginePort.Value)
-----
  trailofbits.go.questionable-assignment.questionable-assignment
  Should `cfg` be modified when an error could be returned?
  Details: https://sg.run/qq6y

771: cfg.IsNativeMode, err = strconv.ParseBool(masterMap[rootConfigName]["isNative"])

shared/services/stader/command.go
  go.lang.security.audit.dangerous-exec-command.dangerous-exec-command
  Detected non-static command inside Command. Audit the input to 'exec.Command'. If unverifi
  user data can reach this call site, this is a code injection vulnerability. A malicious
  actor can inject a malicious script to execute arbitrary code.
  Details: https://sg.run/W8LA

40: cmd:    exec.Command("sh", "-c", cmdText),

```

Semgrep Results

```

shared/services/state/manager.go
  trailofbits.go.questionable-assignment.questionable-assignment
  Should `m` be modified when an error could be returned?
  Details: https://sg.run/qq6y

66: m.BeaconConfig, err = m.bc.GetEth2Config()

shared/services/wallet/wallet.go
  trailofbits.go.questionable-assignment.questionable-assignment
  Should `w` be modified when an error could be returned?
  Details: https://sg.run/qq6y

234: w.mk, err = hdkeychain.NewMaster(w.seed, &chaincfg.MainNetParams)
-----
375: w.seed, err = w.encryptor.Decrypt(w.ws.Crypto, password)
-----
381: w.mk, err = hdkeychain.NewMaster(w.seed, &chaincfg.MainNetParams)
-----
399: w.mk, err = hdkeychain.NewMaster(w.seed, &chaincfg.MainNetParams)

shared/types/config/parameter.go
  trailofbits.go.questionable-assignment.questionable-assignment
  Should `param` be modified when an error could be returned?
  Details: https://sg.run/qq6y

103: param.Value, err = strconv.ParseInt(value, 0, 0)
-----
105: param.Value, err = strconv.ParseUint(value, 0, 0)
-----
111: param.Value, err = strconv.ParseBool(value)

```

```

56: response.SocializingPoolContract, err = services.GetSocializingPoolAddress(c)
-----
60: response.PermissionlessPool, err = services.GetPermissionlessPoolAddress(c)
-----
64: response.StaderOracle, err = services.GetStaderOracleAddress(c)
-----
68: response.StakePoolManager, err = services.GetStakePoolManagerAddress(c)

stader/api/wallet/recover.go
trilofbits.go.questionable-assignment.questionable-assignment
Should `response` be modified when an error could be returned?
Details: https://sg.run/qq6y

89: response.ValidatorKeys, err = walletutils.RecoverStaderKeys(pnr, nodeAccount.Address, w, false)

stader/guardian/metrics-exporter.go
go.lang.security.audit.net.use-tls.use-tls
Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See
https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information.
Details: https://sg.run/dKbY

>>: Autofix ▶ http.ListenAndServeTLS(fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", metricsAddress, metricsPort),
certFile, keyFile, nil)
100: err = http.ListenAndServe(fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", metricsAddress, metricsPort), nil)

```

Scan Summary

Some files were skipped or only partially analyzed.
 Partially scanned: 1 files only partially analyzed due to parsing or internal Semgrep errors

Ran 1077 rules on 293 files: 28 findings.

- No major issues found by Semgrep.

Gosec:

```
/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/stader/guardian/metrics-exporter.go:100 | - G314 (CWE-676): Use of net/http serve
ce: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM
99:     }
> 100:     err = http.ListenAndServe(fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", metricsAddress, metricsPort), nil)
101:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/utills/validator/fee-recipient.go:197 | - G284 (CWE-78): Subprocess laun
196:     // Run validator stop command bound to os stdout/stderr
> 197:     cmd := exec.Command(stopCommand)
198:     cmd.Stdout = os.Stdout

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/utills/validator/fee-recipient.go:108 | - G284 (CWE-78): Subprocess launche
107:     // Run validator restart command bound to os stdout/stderr
> 108:     cmd := exec.Command(restartCommand)
109:     cmd.Stdout = os.Stdout

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/stader/node/merkle-proofs/download.go:76 | - G384 (CWE-22): Potential file inclus
75:     m.Log.Printf("Downloading merkle proof for cycle %d", cycleMerkleProof.Cycle)
> 76:     file, err := os.Create(absolutePathOfProofFile)
77:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/stader/api/node/download-sp-merkle-proofs.go:106 | - G304 (CWE-22): Potential fil
105:
> 106:     file, err := os.Create(absolutePathOfProofFile)
107:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/stader-cli/wallet/utills.go:160 | - G304 (CWE-22): Potential file inclusion via va
159:     // Read the file
> 160:     bytes, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filepath.Join(customKeyDir, fileName()))
161:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/wallet/keystore/prysm/keystore.go:217 | - G304 (CWE-22): Potenti
EDUIM)
216:     // Get the random keystore password
> 217:     passwordBytes, err := ioutil.ReadFile(passwordFilePath)
218:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/wallet/keystore/prysm/keystore.go:120 | - G304 (CWE-22): Potenti
EDUIM)
119:     passwordFilePath := filepath.Join(ks.KeystorePath, KeystoreDir, WalletDir, AccountsDir, KeystorePasswordFileName)
> 120:     passwordBytes, err := ioutil.ReadFile(passwordFilePath)
121:     if err != nil {
```

Security Analysis Output Sample

```
/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/tenacy-client.go:68 | - G304 (CWE-22): Potential file inclusion via variable (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
68:     }
> 69:     configBytes, err := ioutil.ReadFile(expandedPath)
70:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/fee-recipient.go:52 | - G304 (CWE-22): Potential file inclusion via variable (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
51:     expectedString := getFeeRecipientFileContents(feeRecipient, cfg)
> 52:     bytes, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)
53:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/config/stadernode-config.go:518 | - G304 (CWE-22): Potential file inclusion via variable (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
517:     // Open the JSON file
> 518:     file, err := os.Open(absolutePathOfProofFile)
519:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/config/stadernode-config.go:453 | - G304 (CWE-22): Potential file inclusion via variable (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
452:     }
> 453:     data, err := os.ReadFile(expandedCycleMerkleRewardFile)
454:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/config/stader-config.go:147 | - G304 (CWE-22): Potential file inclusion via variable (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
146:     // Read the file
> 147:     configBytes, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)
148:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/config/config-legacy.go:304 | - G304 (CWE-22): Potential file inclusion via variable (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
303:     // Read files squelch not found errors if file is optional
> 304:     bytes, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)
305:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:294 | - G302 (CWE-276): Expect file permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
293:     }
> 294:     err = os.Chmod(prometheusConfigPath, 0664)
295:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/stader/node/node.go:400 | - G301 (CWE-276): Expect directory permissions to be 0750 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
399:     validatorsFolder := filepath.Dir(feeRecipientPath)
> 400:     err = os.MkdirAll(validatorsFolder, 0755)
401:     if err != nil {

/home/kaor2/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/stader-cli/service/service.go:543 | - G301 (CWE-276): Expect directory permissions to be 0750 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
```

```

542:     fat.Print("Recreating data folder... ")
> 543:     err = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(volumePath, "validators"), 0775)
544:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1521] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect directory permissions to be 0750 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
1520:     }
> 1521:     err = os.MkdirAll(customKeyDir, 0775)
1522:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1355] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect directory permissions to be 0750 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
1354:     }
> 1355:     err = os.Mkdir(runtimeFolder, 0775)
1356:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/stader/node/node.go:414] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
413:     }
> 414:     err := ioutil.WriteFile(feeRecipientPath, []byte(defaultFeeRecipientFileContents), 0664)
415:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/utills/stdr/config.go:61] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0660 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
60:     }
> 61:     if err := ioutil.WriteFile(path, configBytes, 0664); err != nil {
62:         return fat.Errorf("could not write stader config to %s: %w", shellescape.Quote(path), err)
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1507] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
1506:     mevBoostComposePath := filepath.Join(runtimeFolder, config.MevBoostContainerName+composeFileSuffix)
> 1507:     err = ioutil.WriteFile(mevBoostComposePath, contents, 0664)
1508:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1493] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
1491:     prometheusComposePath := filepath.Join(runtimeFolder, config.PrometheusContainerName+composeFileSuffix)
> 1492:     err = ioutil.WriteFile(prometheusComposePath, contents, 0664)
1493:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1479] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
1478:     exporterComposePath := filepath.Join(runtimeFolder, config.ExporterContainerName+composeFileSuffix)
> 1479:     err = ioutil.WriteFile(exporterComposePath, contents, 0664)
1480:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1466] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
1465:     grafanaComposePath := filepath.Join(runtimeFolder, config.GrafanaContainerName+composeFileSuffix)
> 1466:     err = ioutil.WriteFile(grafanaComposePath, contents, 0664)
1467:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1451] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
1449:     eth2ComposePath := filepath.Join(runtimeFolder, config.Eth2ContainerName+composeFileSuffix)
> 1450:     err = ioutil.WriteFile(eth2ComposePath, contents, 0664)
1451:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1435] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
1434:     eth1ComposePath := filepath.Join(runtimeFolder, config.Eth1ContainerName+composeFileSuffix)
> 1435:     err = ioutil.WriteFile(eth1ComposePath, contents, 0664)
1436:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1421] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
1420:     validatorComposePath := filepath.Join(runtimeFolder, config.ValidatorContainerName+composeFileSuffix)
> 1421:     err = ioutil.WriteFile(validatorComposePath, contents, 0664)
1422:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1407] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
1407:     guardianComposePath := filepath.Join(runtimeFolder, config.GuardianContainerName+composeFileSuffix)
> 1408:     err = ioutil.WriteFile(guardianComposePath, contents, 0664)
1409:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1395] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
1394:     nodeComposePath := filepath.Join(runtimeFolder, config.NodeContainerName+composeFileSuffix)
> 1395:     err = ioutil.WriteFile(nodeComposePath, contents, 0664)
1396:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1382] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
1381:     apiComposePath := filepath.Join(runtimeFolder, config.ApiContainerName+composeFileSuffix)
> 1382:     err = ioutil.WriteFile(apiComposePath, contents, 0664)
1383:     if err != nil {
}
/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:290] - G386 (CWE-276): Expect WriteFile permissions to be 0600 or less (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
}
289:     // Write the actual Prometheus config file
> 290:     err = ioutil.WriteFile(prometheusConfigPath, contents, 0664)
291:     if err != nil {
}

```

```

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/stader/guardian/metrics-exporter.go:91-98] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
> 91: http.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
> 92:     w.WriteHeader(status)
> 93:     <head><title>Stader Guardian Metrics Exporter</title></head>
> 94:     <body>
> 95:     <h1>Stader Guardian Metrics Exporter</h1>
> 96:     <p><a href="" + metricsPath + "">Metrics</a></p>
> 97:     </body>
> 98:     </html>,
> 99:     })
}

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/stader/cli/service/service.go:620] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
619:     }
> 620:     staderClient.SaveConfig(cfg)
621:     fmt.Printf("\nUpdated settings successfully.\n", colorGreen, colorReset)

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1575] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
1574:     for key, value := range envVars {
> 1575:         os.Setenv(key, shellEscapeQuote(value))
1576:         envArgs += fmt.Sprintf("-e %s ", key)
}

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1369] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
1368:     for name, value := range oldValues {
> 1369:         os.Setenv(name, value)
1378:     }

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1364] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
1363:     oldValues[varName] = os.Getenv(varName)
> 1364:     os.Setenv(varName, varValue)
1365: }

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1205] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
1204:     if ecCommon != nil {
> 1205:         convertUintParam(param, &ecCommon.P2pPort, network, 16)
1206:     }

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1201] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
1200:     if geth != nil {
> 1201:         convertUintParam(param, &geth.MaxPeers, network, 16)
1202:     }

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:1197] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
1196:     if geth != nil {
> 1197:         convertUintParam(param, &geth.CacheSize, network, 0)
1198:     }

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:479] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
478:     cfg.Native.ChttpURL.Value = legacyCfg.Chains.Eth2.Provider
> 479:     c.migrateSelection(legacyCfg.Chains.Eth2.Client.Selected, &cfg.Native.ConsensusClient)
480:     cfg.Native.ValidatorRestartCommand.Value = legacyCfg.StaderNode.ValidatorRestartCommand

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:438] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
437:     case "GRAFANA_PORT":
> 438:         convertUintParam(param, &cfg.Grafana.Port, network, 16)
439:     }

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:436] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
435:     case "PROMETHEUS_PORT":
> 436:         convertUintParam(param, &cfg.Prometheus.Port, network, 16)
437:     case "GRAFANA_PORT":

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:434] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
433:     case "EXPORTER_METRICS_PORT":
> 434:         convertUintParam(param, &cfg.ExporterMetricsPort, network, 16)
435:     case "PROMETHEUS_PORT":

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:432] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
431:     case "NODE_METRICS_PORT":
> 432:         convertUintParam(param, &cfg.NodeMetricsPort, network, 16)
433:     case "EXPORTER_METRICS_PORT":

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:430] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
429:     case "VALIDATOR_METRICS_PORT":
> 430:         convertUintParam(param, &cfg.VCMetricsPort, network, 16)
431:     case "NODE_METRICS_PORT":

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:428] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
427:     case "ETH2_METRICS_PORT":
> 428:         convertUintParam(param, &cfg.BinMetricsPort, network, 16)
429:     case "VALIDATOR_METRICS_PORT":

[/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:415] - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
414:     case "ETH2_RPC_PORT":
> 415:         convertUintParam(param, &cfg.Prysm.RpcPort, network, 16)
416:         port := cfg.Prysm.RpcPort.Value.(uint16)

```

```

/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:401 - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
400:         case "ETH2_P2P_PORT":
> 401:             convertUintParam(param, &cfg.ConsensusCommon.P2pPort, network, 16)
402:         case "ETH2_CHECKPOINT_SYNC_URL":

/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:398 - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
397:         case cfgtypes.ConsensusClient_Teku:
> 398:             convertUintParam(param, &cfg.Teku.MaxPeers, network, 16)
399:     }

/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:396 - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
395:         case cfgtypes.ConsensusClient_Prysm:
> 396:             convertUintParam(param, &cfg.Prysm.MaxPeers, network, 16)
397:         case cfgtypes.ConsensusClient_Teku:

/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:394 - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
393:         case cfgtypes.ConsensusClient_Nimbus:
> 394:             convertUintParam(param, &cfg.Nimbus.MaxPeers, network, 16)
395:         case cfgtypes.ConsensusClient_Prysm:

/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:392 - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
391:         case cfgtypes.ConsensusClient_Lighthouse:
> 392:             convertUintParam(param, &cfg.Lighthouse.MaxPeers, network, 16)
393:         case cfgtypes.ConsensusClient_Nimbus:

/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:286 - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
285:         for name, value := range oldValues {
> 286:             os.Setenv(name, value)
287:         }

/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:275 - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
274:         oldValues[varName] = os.Getenv(varName)
> 275:         os.Setenv(varName, varValue)
276:     }

/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:95 - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
94:     ip6Consensus := externalip.DefaultConsensus(nil, nil)
> 95:     ip6Consensus.UseIPProtocol(6)
96:     return ip6Consensus.ExternalIP()

/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/stader/client.go:88 - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
87:     ip4Consensus := externalip.DefaultConsensus(nil, nil)
> 88:     ip4Consensus.UseIPProtocol(4)
89:     if ip, err := ip4Consensus.ExternalIP(); err == nil {

/home/kaorz/Documents/Work/Halborn/Projects/staderlabs/stader-node-v1.1/shared/services/config/stader-config.go:459 - G104 (CWE-703): Errors unhandled. (Confidence: HIGH, Severity: LOW)
458:     cfg.StaderNode.Network.Value = cfg.StaderNode.Network.Options[0].Value
> 459:     cfg.applyAllDefaults()
460: }

Summary:
Gosec : 2.10.0
Files  : 216
Lines  : 70958
Nosec  : 0
Issues : 38

```

- File permission issues were flagged correctly
- Flagged potential file inclusion has been reviewed, and it does not pose any risk
- Code execution related issues have been reviewed; they do not pose any risk
- Some unhandled errors were flagged correctly
- No major issues found by `gosec`

CodeQL :

```
Severity : warning [ 4 ]
• crypto-com/cosmos-sdk-codeql/floating-point-arithmetic Floating point arithmetic operations are not associative and a possible source of non-determinism: 61
• crypto-com/cosmos-sdk-codeql/map-iteration Iteration over map may be a possible source of non-determinism: 30
  o hared/services/config/stader-config.go:494
  o hared/services/config/stader-config.go:577
  o hared/services/config/stader-config.go:724
  o hared/services/config/stader-config.go:778
  o hared/services/config/stader-config.go:1001
  o hared/services/config/stader-config.go:1023
  o hared/services/config/stader-config.go:1025
  o hared/services/config/stader-config.go:1099
  o hared/services/config/stader-config.go:1122
  o hared/services/stader/client.go:273
  o hared/services/stader/client.go:285
  o hared/services/stader/client.go:1316
  o hared/services/stader/client.go:1362
  o hared/services/stader/client.go:1368
  o hared/services/stader/client.go:1574
  o hared/services/stader/client.go:1585
  o hared/services/wallet/validator.go:168
  o hared/services/wallet/validator.go:183
  o hared/services/wallet/validator.go:253
  o hared/services/wallet/validator.go:299
  o hared/utills/sys/cpu-flags.go:54
  o tader-cli/node/claim-sp-rewards.go:135
  o tader-cli/service/commands.go:112
  o tader-cli/service/service.go:434
  o tader/api/node/status.go:250
  o tader/guardian/collector/beacon-chain-collector.go:106
  o tader/guardian/collector/beacon-chain-collector.go:125
  o tader/guardian/collector/beacon-chain-collector.go:144
  o tader/guardian/collector/beacon-chain-collector.go:160
  o tader/node/node.go:299
• crypto-com/cosmos-sdk-codeql/sensitive-import Certain system packages contain functions which may be a possible source of non-determinism: 10
• crypto-com/cosmos-sdk-codeql/goroutine Spawning a Go routine may be a possible source of non-determinism: 9
```

Figure 1: Sample of CodeQL results

Security Analysis Output Sample

Govulncheck:

```

Vulnerability #1: GO-2023-1840
On Unix platforms, the Go runtime does not behave differently
when a binary is run with the setuid/setgid bits. This can be
dangerous in certain cases, such as when dumping memory state,
or assuming the status of standard i/o file descriptors. If a
setuid/setgid binary is executed with standard I/O file
descriptors closed, opening any files can result in unexpected
content being read or written with elevated privileges.
Similarly, if a setuid/setgid program is terminated, either via
panic or signal, it may leak the contents of its registers.

More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2023-1840

Standard Library
Found in: runtime@go1.20.3
Fixed in: runtime@go1.20.5

Call stacks in your code:
github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/shared/services.init calls github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethclient.init, which eventually calls runtime
github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/shared/services/beamon/client.init calls github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/V3/crypto/bls.init, which event
github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/shared/utills/sys.init calls runtime.init
github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/stader-lib/utills/eth.init calls github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/accounts/abi/bind.init, which eventuall
github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/stader-lib/utills/eth.init calls github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/accounts/abi/bind.init, which eventuall
github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/stader/guardian/init calls github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp.init, which eventua
github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/stader/guardian/collector.init calls github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus.init, which eventua
github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/stader/node.init calls github.com/wealdtech/go-eth2-types/v2.init, which eventually calls runtime.Calle
shared/services/gas/gas.go:134:132: github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/shared/services/gas.GetHeadlessMaxFeeWei calls runtime.TypeAssertio
shared/services/gas/gas.go:134:132: github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/shared/services/gas.GetHeadlessMaxFeeWei calls runtime.PlanError.E
shared/services/services.go:536:15: github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/shared/services.gettocker calls sync.Once.Do, which eventually call
shared/services/services.go:536:15: github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/shared/services.gettocker calls sync.Once.Do, which eventually call
shared/utills/validator/fee-recipient.go:197:22: github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/shared/utills/validator.StopValidator calls os/exec.Com
stader-cli/stader-cli.go:854:19: github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/stader-cli.main calls github.com/urfave/cli.App.Run, which eventually
stader/guardian/metrics-exporter.go:100:27: github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/stader/guardian.runMetricsServer calls net/http.ListenAndServe
stader/stader.go:825:16: github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/stader.main calls fmt.Fprintln, which e
eventually calls runtime.Func.FileLine
stader/stader.go:825:16: github.com/stader-labs/stader-node/stader.main calls fmt.Fprintln, which eventually calls runtime.ReadMemStats

=== Informational ===

Found 1 vulnerability in packages that you import, but there are no call
stacks leading to the use of this vulnerability. You may not need to
take any action. See https://pkg.go.dev/golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck
for details.

Vulnerability #1: GO-2022-1098
Erroneous message decoding can cause denial of service. Improper
checking of maximum witness size during node message decoding
prevented nodes in Lightning Labs lnd (before 0.15.2-beta) to
sync.
More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2022-1098
Found in: github.com/btcsuite/btcd@v0.23.1
Fixed in: github.com/btcsuite/btcd@v0.23.2
    
```

Security Analysis Output Sample

Nancy:

Security Analysis Output Sample

It is important to note that, while Nancy reports issues in the project’s dependencies, Halborn verified that all issues reported by Nancy are false positives that do not affect this project:

- **go-ethereum** vulnerabilities: Nancy reports vulnerabilities that affect older versions of Geth; Stader’s version is safe.
- **btcsuite** vulnerabilities: The codebase uses Bitcoin libraries only for verifying hardware wallets and is unaffected by the vulnerabilities associated with this version.

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>pkg:golang/github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum@v1.10.26 3 known vulnerabilities affecting installed version</p> | |
| <p>[CVE-2021-42219] OWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion')</p> | |
| Description | <p>Go-Ethereum v1.10.9 was discovered to contain an issue which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (DOS) via sending an excessive amount of messages to a node. This is caused by missing memory in the component /ethash/algorithm.go.</p> <p>Sonatype's research suggests that this CVE's details differ from those defined at NVD. See https://ossindex.sonatype.org/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42219 for details</p> |
| OSS Index ID | CVE-2021-42219 |
| CVSS Score | 7.5/10 (High) |
| CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
| Link for more info | https://ossindex.sonatype.org/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42219?component-type=golang&component-name=github.com%2Fethereum%2Fgo-ethereum&utm_source=nancy-client&utm_medium=integration&utm_content=1.0.42 |
| <p>[CVE-2022-23328] OWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion')</p> | |
| Description | <p>A design flaw in all versions of Go-Ethereum allows an attacker node to send 5120 pending transactions of a high gas price from one account that all fully spend the full balance of the account to a victim geth node, which can purge all of pending transactions in a victim node's memory pool and then occupy the memory pool to prevent new transactions from entering the pool, resulting in a denial of service (DoS).</p> |
| OSS Index ID | CVE-2022-23328 |
| CVSS Score | 7.5/10 (High) |
| CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
| Link for more info | https://ossindex.sonatype.org/vulnerability/CVE-2022-23328?component-type=golang&component-name=github.com%2Fethereum%2Fgo-ethereum&utm_source=nancy-client&utm_medium=integration&utm_content=1.0.42 |
| <p>[CVE-2022-37450] OWE-20: Improper Input Validation</p> | |
| Description | <p>Go Ethereum (aka geth) through 1.10.21 allows attackers to increase rewards by mining blocks in certain situations, and using a manipulation of time-difference values to achieve replacement of main-chain blocks, aka Riskless Uncle Making (RUM), as exploited in the wild in 2020 through 2022.</p> |
| OSS Index ID | CVE-2022-37450 |
| CVSS Score | 5.9/10 (Medium) |
| CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
| Link for more info | https://ossindex.sonatype.org/vulnerability/CVE-2022-37450?component-type=golang&component-name=github.com%2Fethereum%2Fgo-ethereum&utm_source=nancy-client&utm_medium=integration&utm_content=1.0.42 |
| <p>pkg:golang/github.com/btcsuite/btcd@v0.23.1 2 known vulnerabilities affecting installed version</p> | |
| <p>[CVE-2022-44797] OWE-617: Resizable Assertion</p> | |
| Description | <p>btcd before 0.23.2, as used in Lightning Labs lnd before 0.15.2-beta and other Bitcoin-related products, mishandles witness size checking.</p> <p>Sonatype's research suggests that this CVE's details differ from those defined at NVD. See https://ossindex.sonatype.org/vulnerability/CVE-2022-44797 for details</p> |
| OSS Index ID | CVE-2022-44797 |

Figure 2: Sample of Nancy results



THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

// HALBORN

